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4
Beholden to the Bear: The Political
Economy of European Natural Gas Trade
with Russia
Jessica Miltenberger

Background & Existing Literature
While oil has been perceived as political since the oil shocks of the 1970s, natural gas is
a relatively new political commodity1. In fact, it had almost no role in the European energy
market until large domestic reserves were discovered in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s2. Since then, natural gas has burgeoned into what is arguably
the most important energy commodity in Europe. In the EU, where 62.8% of natural gas
is used for personal and home use3, electricity and heat are almost synonymous with gas. As
the dozen people who froze to death as a result of the January 2009 gas dispute4 learned,
electricity and heat—and by inference natural gas—mean life.
The January 2009 incident was an almost-perfect echo of what occurred in January
of 2006, and again in March of 2008, when Russian-administered gas company Gazprom
drastically cut natural gas supplies to the Ukraine—through which all but one of the gas
pipelines to Europe must pass—as the result of a dispute over payment of a contract. In the
case of 2008, this action caused natural gas exports to parts of the EU to drop by as much
as 40%5. That August, following the Russian invasion of Georgia, the European Union
admitted that it could not realistically impose economic sanctions on Russia since the EU
is dependent upon the former for approximately 30% of its oil and almost 50% of its natural

1 Delvaux, B., Hunt, M., & Talus, K. (2008). EU Energy Law and Policy Issues:The Energy Law Research Forum Collection. Lanham, MD: Bernan Press(Pa). pp 131
2 Eurostat. Gas and Electricity Market Statistics with CD-ROM. 2007 ed. Belgium: European Communities, 2007.
pp 36
3 Eurostat. Gas and Electricity Market Statistics with CD-ROM. 2007 ed. Belgium: European Communities, 2007.
pp 37
4 Kramer, A. E.. (2009, January 18). Russia and Ukraine Reach Deal on Gas. The New York Times. Retrieved November 5, 2009, from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/world/europe/19gazprom.html.
5 Gazprom restores Ukraine gas flow. (2008, March 5). BBC NEWS. Retrieved September 28, 2008, from http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7276589.stm
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gas6 7. This political ramification of a seemingly economic discrepancy begins to illustrate
why a purely economic approach to EU energy security is insufficient to explain the puzzle.
If states truly were unitary actors driven to maximize utility through trade, one would
expect to see EU member states choosing their primary gas supplier based on whatever
source has the cheapest price. While it is true that much of the EU remains dependent on
Russia due to their ability to supply the cheapest natural gas, this does not explain why we
see some states making the pointed choice to adopt more expensive energy sources in an
effort to diversify away from Russia. That is because a simple supply and demand model
fails to take into account the basic drive of states to maximize security through trade. Gowa
and Mansfield’s model of power politics and international trade points out that trade “enhances the potential military power of any country that engages in it,” and moreover, “trade
with an adversary produces a security diseconomy; trade with an ally produces a positive
externality.”8
This idea may better explain why states like Lithuania9 and Hungary10 are willing to
pay a higher price for diversification despite the economic hardship it would create, in order
to balance their security through trade. However, it is a mistake to think that natural gas is
a purely economic commodity with a security dimension—rather, it should be considered a
security commodity with an economic dimension. The necessity of natural gas in maintaining the civilized world is such that a break in its supply is enough to cause chaos and even
threaten lives, as it did during the gas cutoffs in the winters of 2006, 2008 and 2009.
Some authors argue that European energy security can only be successfully addressed
from the supranational level of the European Union. Indeed, it is on this proposed solution that the EU itself focuses. However, the EU-centric option has shown its ineffectiveness time and again when is comes to addressing Russia’s energy dominance, and simple
domestic discrepancies in energy policy have served to stall the entire dialogue, such as the
unwillingness of states to invest in a shared energy infrastructure. By choosing instead to
unilaterally make deals with Russia (as Germany has) or protect domestic energy industry from supranational regulation (as France has) the greatest players within the European
Union are demonstrating that energy security is an issue firmly in the domestic political
domain, as well as the economic.
Moreover, in order to engage the cumbersome gears of the EU, every move by the
6 Russia Cool on EU Energy Deregulation. (2007, October 25). The Moscow News. Retrieved November 23, 2008
from http://www.mnweekly.ru/business/20071025/55285360.html.
7 See also: Roberts, pg. 49, Hadfield, pg. 232
8 Gowa, J. and Mansfield, E. D. (1993, June) “Power Politics and International Trade,” American Political Science
Review, 87(2)., pp. 408.
9 The closing of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) on Dec. 31st, 2009 (per Lithuania’s accession agreement
with the European Union in 2004) means a more than doubling of electricity prices, and an energy deficit forcing it
to look at using gas bought from Russia. Energy imports from Russia are expected to rise to 45% of total consumption over the next year. (http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/21908/) Lithuania’s government is currently
appealing to the EU for funding to build thousands of wind turbines in an effort to stave off a more permanent
dependence on Russia.
10 Hungary relies on imports for over half of its primary energy requirements. Domestic natural gas reserves are
almost gone, and demand for natural gas in Hungary is expected to increase by about 20% over the next 10 years,
over which period domestic production will fall by some 30%. (http://www.ecee.org/pubs/hungary.htm#energy)
In March of 2009, a Russian energy group purchased an Austrian company’s share of Hungary’s largest energy company—MOL—for its twice market value, thus securing a large voice in Hungarian energy production and imports.
(http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/03/30/54170/russia-invades-the-hungarian-energy-sector/)
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European Union must be extensively vetted and debated on national, intergovernmental,
and supranational levels. For this reason, Russia has consistently been able to head off attempts by the EU to distance itself from the former. For example, in the late 1990s, the
US and the European Union were engaged in a joint project to fund a new gas line from
Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea through Turkey and into Europe. Perceiving the consequences of this, Russia rushed to build their Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea
into Turkey, whose gas market was not large enough to support both pipelines. The Blue
Stream pipeline was completed in 2002, leaving the EU’s slow and unwieldy bureaucratic
effort to crumble, the project defunct before construction even began11.
These and other failures to form a cohesive energy policy have demonstrated that
cooperation on energy in Europe remains an intergovernmental process rather than a supranational one. Consequently, while a secure supply of natural gas is of paramount concern to
many, a united EU energy policy cannot come about without understanding the motivations behind its members’ choices with regard to Russia as an energy supplier.
Methods
This research will assess the fit of a new domestic political economy model and discuss
the relative stances of four case studies within the larger sample based on their position within the model’s framework. To do this, a nested research design was used, which involves
establishing patterns among a small sample size (in this case, the 27 EU member states), and
choosing case studies from the sample that exemplify the comparative points of research and
thus better assess the observed relationships between variables.
By limiting the sphere of research to countries within the European Union, the present research is controlling for as many otherwise confounding variables as possible. States
within the EU are all bound by the same internal and external trade policies, thus limiting
the confounding variable of interstate trade regulations. Limiting the scope to EU member
states also controls for monetary policy due to the Union’s single currency policies, so trade
values are consistent throughout the measured countries. Alliance is also controlled for,
since states within the EU have all formally recognized the legitimacy of one another’s governments and seemingly reached a positive peace. Moreover, all EU member states—with
the exception of Austria—are part of NATO, which controls for much of their foreign
security policy.
Additionally, for the purpose of limiting variables, natural gas will be the sole energy
resource examined in this research. Natural gas was chosen over oil (and over a combination of the two) as the most pertinent energy variable for several reasons. First, natural gas
pipelines have been at the center of the recent energy disputes that have brought the EU’s
energy dependence to the forefront of the European political stage. Second, natural gas is
the most consistent source of electricity and heat throughout the EU, thus impacting the
survival and wellbeing of most of the European population12.

11 Baran, Zyeno (2007, 1 October) EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage
Washington Quarterly, 30(4), pp. 138.
12 Delvaux, B., Hunt, M., & Talus, K. (2008). EU Energy Law and Policy Issues: The Energy Law Research Forum Collection. Lanham, MD: Bernan Press(Pa).
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Economic Factors
There is no doubt that price plays an important role in EU member states’ decisions
regarding gas suppliers. For some states it is simply not economically feasible to attempt to
diversify away from Russia should they wish to do so. The best measure of a state’s ability to
move away from Russia as their primary supplier of natural gas is to determine the flexibility
of demand for natural gas in that state. If very flexible—i.e. a sharp rise in price would mean
a sharp decline in the purchase of natural gas—then one can logically extrapolate that such
a state could more easily substitute away from Russia and shoulder the burden of extra cost
in order to gain a steady supply elsewhere. It also implies that Russia’s use of the “energy
weapon” against such a state would have less of a coercive effect, since that state can more
easily accommodate a drop in supply.
To measure this, the present research divided the percent change in quantity of natural
gas demanded by the percent change in price of natural gas between 2005 and 2008. The
year 2005 was chosen as a starting point since the first Russia-Ukraine pipeline dispute and
subsequent disruption did not take place until the following year. This means the data is
current, but unskewed by the aftershocks of the gas crisis. The year 2008 was chosen as its
comparison because it is the most recent data available at present. As a robustness check,
this data will be compared to the broader findings of the United States’ Energy Information
Administration’s 2006 European gas dependence statistics, which were measured based on
the percentage of Russian natural gas composing total domestic consumption in each state.
Political Factors
The primary political factor utilized in the present research was Eric Gartzke’s Affinity
of Nations data set, which utilizes Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic’s UN General Assembly Voting data to establish voting trends between state dyads13. Gartzke’s research argues
that because the gains to be had from voting in the General Assembly are few—many view
the action as largely symbolic—there is a higher level of honesty in expressing preference.
The extent of the General Assembly voting records also makes it possible to get broad longitudinal measures that minimize the effects of short-term variation in political leadership,
focusing instead on long-term political affinity.
For the present research, voting affinity was averaged for the dyads of each EU member state and Russia from 1990 through 2002. 1990 was chosen as an obvious starting point
because of the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the shaping of Europe and the
European Union, while 2002 was the most recent data available at present.
As a robustness check and to underscore the political affinity findings based in the Affinity of Nations dataset, this research will examine the information collected by the 2009
Transatlantic Trends group. Previous generations of research have shown public opinion to
be a well-established link to public policy in democracies14 15. For this reason, the information collected by the 2009 Transatlantic Trends group is both interesting and pertinent.
Transatlantic Trends surveyed over 11,000 people in eleven European countries—Bulgaria,
13 Voeten, E. and Merdzanovic, A. (2006) United Nations General Assembly Voting Data. Accessed October 29,
2009 from http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/UNVoting.htm.
14 Erikson, R.S. (1976) The Relationship between Public Opinion and State Policy: A New Look Based on Some
Forgotten Data. American Journal of Political Science, 20(1), pp. 25-36.
15 Page, B. I. and Shapiro, R. Y. (1983) Effects of Public Opinion on Policy. The American Political Science Review,
77(1) pp. 175-190.
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France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and
The United Kingdom—collecting individual views on their states’ foreign policy, global
leadership, and other international issues16.
In analyzing the reasoning behind EU member states’ choice of Russia as an energy
supplier, the present research will assess the fit of a political economy model and discuss the
relative position of four case studies within the larger sample based on their positions within
the model’s framework. In a large-n statistical world, we would generate a large dataset and
statistically test for correlations among variables. However, the small number of member
states in the European Union precludes this possibility. Instead, a variation on Lieberman’s
synergistic “nested research design” was used. This research and analysis method involves
using statistical analysis to establish patterns among a small sample size (in this case, the 27
EU member states). The nested research design process provides direction for case study
selection, allowing the researcher to choose case studies from the sample that exemplify the
comparative points of research and thus better assess the observed relationships between
variables.
Initially, it was anticipated that there might be a direct relationship between the chosen political and economic variables. However, a pair-wise correlation test showed only a
statistically insignificant weak negative correlation (Pearson’s r = -0.22243). This weak correlation result turned out to be a good thing, since it ensured that the two variables move independently of one another. Therefore, changes in one factor or the other, or both, would
affect states in different ways, creating a variety of situations to be examined. See pages 48
and 49 for the scatter plots of the results, with the median of each dataset delineated.
As previously discussed, the reasons for an EU member state choosing Russia as an
energy trading partner can be divided into two broad categories: politically- and economically-motivated. Looking at the scatter plots, one can see that member states can be divided
into four quadrants based on their levels of political affinity and economic flexibility. In
trying to determine which force would prevail given individual circumstances, states’ political tendencies were subdivided into either Russophobe or Russophile, and their economic
dependence was classified based on high versus low price sensitivity. The result was the
following table:
Political orientation
Russophile

Russophobe

Elastic

Ally

Enemy

Inelastic

Friend

Customer

Price
Sensitivity

16 The survey results “can say with 95% confidence that the margin of error attributable to sampling and other
random effects is plus or minus three percentage points… Europe-wide figures are weighted on the basis of the size
of the adult population in each country.”
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Chart 1: Relationship between Price Elasticity of Demand and UN Voting Affinity

Chart 2: Relationship between Price Elasticity of Demand and UN Voting Affinity (Zoomed area of Chart 1)
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This table was utilized in choosing case studies, with efforts toward examining four
states who exemplify each of the four classifications above (Ally, Friend, Customer, and
Enemy). The present research will endeavor to describe the theoretical reasoning behind
the choice of each case study, and thereafter give examples of recent instances where these
economic and political drives have been displayed.
Results
As you can see more closely in Table 1 (page 51), price elasticity of demand was
calculated for each EU member state, with the exception of Cyprus, Finland, Greece and
Malta, for whom some or all of the required data was unavailable. The overall mean price
elasticity of demand was 0.805. However, this is misleadingly high, as one state—Austria—
constituted an extreme outlier with an elasticity of 8. This is due to the fact that Austria’s
gas imports—which are quite low—go mainly to industrial, rather than residential, sectors.
Over 60 percent of Austria’s electricity is produced with hydropower, and 36 percent by
thermal power production17. Therefore, any drop in natural gas supply causes minimal effect, while any rise in price causes a drastic drop in demand. If one removes Austria from
the equation, the new mean European Union price elasticity of demand becomes 0.479, a
far less flexible rate.
Erik Voeten and Adis Merdzanovic’s Affinity of Nations data was coded as follows:
1 = “yes” or approval for an issue; 2 = abstain, 3 = “no” or disapproval for an issue18. The
result is a number that codes values for the data range from –1 (least similar interests) to 1
(most similar interests). Looking at the data in Table 1, one can see that no dyad falls below
0.4, but this is to be expected when one takes into account the geographic, economic, and
historical commonalities and relationships among this group of states. Nevertheless, there is
still a large degree of variation between EU members with regard to their political affinity
toward Russia, with some states scoring as high as 0.93 and others as low as 0.45.
To underscore these findings, public survey data from the 2009 Transatlantic Trends
survey was examined. Though the common perception tends to be of a Russophobic Central and Eastern Europe—worried about the bear on their doorstep—and a complacent,
unconcerned Western Europe that freely trades with its former enemy since capitalism
bears no grudges19, the most recent popular opinion survey data in the EU contradicts this
assumption. When asked “[t]o what extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s role
as an energy supplier?” 2009 Transatlantic Trends data showed that majorities in all states in
the EU are “concerned.” While Central and Eastern Europeans were more concerned over
Russian energy dependence than their Western counterparts—73 percent versus 67 percent,
respectively—the data showed that citizens in Western states were more upset over their
increased dependence on Russia as an energy supplier. Overall, Western Europe also saw
a higher level of anxiety over Russia’s treatment of its neighbors than did the Central and
Eastern European states that make up Russia’s backyard. These high levels of public alarm
indicate just how uneasy it makes citizens of the EU to see their own growing dependence
on Russia, and their fear over the situation’s political implications.
Within these broad geographic trends, there was even more variation among individ17 Energy Use in Austria. Umwelt Bundesamt (Environmental Agency of Austria). Retrieved February 9, 2010, from
http://www.umweltbundesamt.at/umweltschutz/energie/energie_austria/ [translated by Google]
18 Gartzke, E. (2006). Codebook: THE AFFINITY OF NATIONS INDEX, 1946-2002,Version 4.0, pp. 3.
19 Transatlantic Trends. (2009) “Key Findings 2009.” Transatlantic Trends No. 5, pp 11.
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Table 1
State'

1Cla ssificationl

Austria

Belgium
(Ally)

(C ustomer)

Hungary
Irela nd
Italy
Latvia

Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slova ki a
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden

UK

(Fri end)

(Enemy )

8'
0
0.64
0.02
0
0.03
0.0 1
0.05
N/A
0.04
2.18
0.14
0.02
0.15
0.46
0.62
0.08
0.7
1.88 3
0.13
0.28
0.65
0.03
2.42

74
8
89
84
0
105
26
43
72

62
0
30
112
88
N/A

9
52
0
23
108
57
0
0
0

P i ~eline4

Mean Affinil:t: '90-'02

1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0

0.9
0.87
0.92
0.89 7
0.87
0.9 5
0.83
0. 86
0.93
0.89
0.63
0.87

Transatlantic Trends
Mean Concern Level (%}

50.66666

77

0.91 5

0.915
0.86
0.86
0.91
0.88
0.92
0.91 7

66

0.91 6
0.91
0.87
0.45

77.33333

' Insufficient data for Cyprus, Finland and Malta
' Austria's gas goes mainly 10 non-private sectors. In Austria electricity is produced with hydro-power (59%), followed by thermal power production (36%).
The share of wind energy is around 3%. <http://www.umweltbundesamt.aUenfumweltschutzienergiefenergie_austrial>
l Th is is a misleadingly high PEoD due to a substantial shift caused by the opening of a sencond nuclear reactor in Romania in 2007, which doubled the amount of electricity
supplied by nuclear power generation to 18%. resulting in a sudden and dramatic drop in natural gas consumption .<http://www.aecl.ca/NewsRoomiNewsIPress-20071071005.htm>
• Russian-owned Of dominated gas pipeline. Coded a follows : 1 " has a pipeline passing through or terminating in ; 0 " does not have a pipeline passing
through. See EtA pipeline map [Attachment I]
5UN General Assembly Votes only avail able from 1991 to 2002
S UN
1

General Assembly Votes only available from 1992 to 2002.

UN General Assembly Votes only available from 1993 to 2002.
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ual member states. Averaged levels of concern about energy security with regard to Russia
were calculated using the responses to the three questions asked in the survey: 1) “To what
extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s role as an energy supplier?” 2) “To what
extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors?” 3) “To
what extent you approve or disapprove of [the idea that] we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even if this requires additional investments to acquire different energy
sources?” As anticipated, the mean levels of concern over energy security with regard to
Russia appear inversely related to the affinity of nations scores.
Case Studies
The Ally: Bulgaria
The archetypal “Ally” primarily trades with Russia despite the fact that it could afford
to diversify natural gas suppliers due to elastic price sensitivity. In addition, the Ally has
Russophilic policies and positive public opinion toward Russia. Based on the data collected
in Table 1 and seen more closely in Table 1.1, one can see that Bulgaria fits both of these
criteria.
Table 1.1
State
Bulgaria

Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption
of Demand
that is Russian Gas
0.64
89

Mean
Pipeline Affinity'90-'02
1
0.92

Transatlantic Trends
Mean Concern Level (%)
50.66666

Economically, Bulgaria has a far more elastic demand that most of the European Union
at 0.64, despite the fact that they get at least 89 percent of their natural gas from Russia20.
Despite this comparatively high potential for diversification without severe economic damage, Bulgaria has chosen to undertake numerous co-sponsored projects with Russian gas
companies, some of which undermine their European neighbors’ efforts at diversification.
In addition to the 92 percent alignment with Russia that can be seen in United Nations General Assembly voting patterns, public survey data has served to underline the
observed affinity between Bulgaria and Russia. In the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey,
when asked, “To what extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s role as an energy
provider?” Bulgarians answered with the second-highest rate of “not concerned” responses,
at 36 percent. Furthermore, when posited the question, “To what extent are you concerned
or not about Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors?” 47 percent of Bulgarians responded
that they were “not concerned”—the highest number of unconcerned responses of any
country in Europe—with only 40 percent expressing any concern at all (the lowest rate in
Europe). Finally, when asked “To what extent you approve or disapprove of [the idea that]
we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even if this requires additional investments to acquire different energy sources?” only 56 percent of Bulgarian citizens approved
of the idea, marking the lowest rate of approval in Europe by a large margin21.
The Bulgarian responses to the above questions serve to underscore its placement
firmly in the camp of “Ally,” which was chosen based on its price elasticity of demand and
its United Nations Affinity of Nations scores in Table 1. Based on this theoretical classifica20 International Energy Data and Analysis for Bulgaria. (2010, January 6). U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Retrieved January 9, 2010, from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=BG&Go=Go
21 Romania had the next lowest approval rating at 71 percent.
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tion, one would expect to see Bulgaria acting as an Ally by participating in further Russian
energy projects, despite the availability of other options for diversification, and perhaps even
to the detriment of other EU member states.
In keeping with these expectations, Bulgaria is currently jointly developing several
projects with Russia, including the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, which will transport
Russian oil overland from the Bulgarian Black Sea to the Aegean Sea, bypassing Turkey22.
On the alternative fuels front, Bulgaria has hired Gazprombank-owned Atomstroyexport to
build a second nuclear power plan in Belene, Bulgaria, in which the Russian company is
expected to maintain a majority share23.
With regard to natural gas, though Bulgaria is a signatory on the proposed Nabucco
pipeline project—which is being subsidized by the EU specifically to relieve dependence
on Russian gas, and involves importing Iranian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian gas via Turkey
into Europe—it has also signed on to the Russian South Stream pipeline project. The South
Stream Pipeline was proposed by Russian gas company Gazprom in 2006 and is set to directly compete with the EU-funded Nabucco Pipeline.
Despite the fact that Nabucco was proposed much earlier, in 2002, Bulgaria elected
to sign the preliminary agreement with Russia for the South Stream pipeline in January of
2008, five months before the Nabucco project came to the table for its transit states. By
signing on to Russian-backed South Stream, Bulgaria is sending a clear message that regardless of its economic ability to substitute away in favor of the EU-sponsored Nabucco, it will
make the political choice to increase ties with Russia as an energy supplier.
The Friend: Slovakia
The characteristic “Friend” has inelastic price sensitivity that makes diversification
away from Russian gas supplies difficult, and maintains Russophilic policies and positive
public opinion toward Russia. Slovakia fits this mold with very inelastic price elasticity of
demand at 0.13 and a 108 percent dependence24 on Russia for their natural gas supply, yet
a 0.91 affinity of nations score—one of the highest.
Table 1.2
State
Slovakia

Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption
of Demand
that is Russian Gas
0.13
108

Mean
Transatlantic Trends
Pipeline Affinity'90-'02 Mean Concern Level (%)
1
0.917
66

Interestingly, data from Transatlantic Trends presents a somewhat conflicted picture of
Slovakian public opinion toward Russia with regard to energy security. Though the majority of responses indicated a positive public opinion toward close ties with Russia, when
the Transatlantic Trends Group asked Slovakians, “To what extent are you concerned or
not about Russia’s role as an energy provider?” 72 percent expressed “concern”—a rate
higher than the mean European score of 66 percent. The theoretical model presented by
22 Russia, Bulgaria to discuss joint energy projects in Sophia. (2009, 11 December). EU-Russia Centre. Retrieved
March 1, 2010 from http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/news/russia-bulgaria-discuss-joint-energy-projects-sophia.
html.
23 Bulgaria May Extend Contract with Russia’s Atomstroyexport. (2010, 23 March). Novinite Sophia News Agency.
Retrieved March 30, 2010, from http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=114578.ft.
24 Slovakia consistently imports more natural gas than it can consumes and alternatively either sells the surplus to
neighboring states or stores it in anticipation of shortages.
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the present research would anticipate a lower than average score for this question. However, looking at the other survey questions before returning to this one provided context
for interpreting its meaning.
In answer to the following question: “To what extent are you concerned or not about
Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors?” Slovakians had the third-lowest rate of concern
at 52 percent, and the second-highest number of “not concerned” responses, at 43 percent
(the highest being Bulgaria). This seems to indicate that, whatever their concerns about
Russian gas supplies, Slovakians do not feel threatened by Russia in a more general security
sense.
Furthermore, when asked, “To what extent you approve or disapprove of [the idea
that] we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even if this requires additional
investments to acquire different energy sources?” only 74 percent of citizens in Slovakia
“approve[d].” This was the third-lowest score in Europe, after Bulgaria and Romania, and
four percent below the European Union average of 78 percent. Still, it did not miss the average mark by much, perhaps marking the balancing point between feeling minimal threat
from Russia in a general sense while still favoring a more secure supply source of natural gas.
To further understand and underscore Slovakia’s political inclination toward Russia,
it is helpful to look at questions regarding two other security topics from the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey. First, when asked, “To what extent you approve or disapprove that
the European Union provide security assistance for emerging democracies like Ukraine
and Georgia?” Slovakians had the second lowest number of “approve” responses at only
55 percent (the lowest approval rating coming from Bulgaria). Furthermore, when asked
the same question but substituting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security
assistance for EU assistance, Slovakia once again had the second-lowest approval rating at
only 45 percent—despite Slovakia being a NATO member. While these two questions are
not gas-related, they deal with another struggle between the European and Russian spheres
of influence—and, tellingly, Slovakia sides with Russia on both counts.
To return to the topic of energy, when asked, “To what extent you approve or disapprove of [the idea that] we should increase energy cooperation with Russia even if its government is undemocratic?” 65 percent of Slovakians responded that they “approve[d]”—the
third highest response level and over 10 percent higher than the European average of 52
percent.
In keeping with the theoretical model, one would expect to see Slovakia willing to
increase energy cooperation with any low-cost supplier due to its heavy dependence on
natural gas and inflexible price elasticity, while perhaps trying to avoid projects which might
upset Russia. Along these lines, November of 2009 saw Slovakia’s proposal to the Russian
Energy Ministry for jointly developing a network of underground gas storage facilities in
Slovakia, for the purpose of securing natural gas supplies for Slovakian citizens in the event
of another cut in gas supply via Ukraine25. In the same meeting, Slovakia agreed to a change
in government policy to allow Russia a stake in Slovakia’s domestic gas distribution network. In exchange, Russia agreed to update and extend the Soviet-era Druzhba oil pipeline,
which runs from Russia into Bratislava, and remains Slovakia’s single largest artery for oil in

25 Slovakia asks Russia to guarantee uninterrupted gas supplies. (2009, 13 November). EU-Russia Centre. Retrieved December 2, 2009, from http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/news/slovakia-asks-russia-guarantee-uninterrupted-gas-supplies.html.
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a country 100 percent dependent on Russia for its primary energy.26 27
With regard to Nabucco, Slovakia has petitioned for the addition of two pipeline
interconnectors on the Nabucco project—a connection between Slovakia and Poland, and
one between Slovakia and Hungary—which would simplify interstate gas transfers and
make the Nabucco project far more beneficial to Slovakia, despite it not being on the direct
route of the proposed pipeline28.
Collectively, all of these actions demonstrate both the political willingness of Slovakia
to work with Russia as well as its economic concern with regard to Russia’s dependability as
a supplier. Slovakia has made it clear that it will pursue the least expensive and most reliable
gas option, while trying to balance its domestic political ties with both Russia and the EU.
The Customer: Germany
The model “Customer” would prefer not to trade with Russia for political reasons,
but economics trump these concerns due to the inelastic price sensitivity. The Customer
represents those states trying to break free of Russian monopoly of their natural gas market.
Table 1.3
State
Germany

Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption
of Demand
that is Russian Gas

0.05

43

Mean
Transatlantic Trends
Pipeline Affinity'90-'02 Mean Concern Level (%)

1

0.86

77

Looking at Table 1.3, one can see that Germany fits well into the Customer mold.
Despite generating a large percentage of their electricity from domestic coal sources, Germany is the fourth largest natural gas consumer in the world and the second largest importer29. As a result of this dependence, Germany has very inelastic price sensitivity of natural
gas at 0.05 and receives an estimated 43 percent of its natural gas from Russia.
In alignment with the theoretical model, we can see that Germany’s affinity with
Russia in the UN General Assembly voting records only extends as far as 86 percent. This
is particularly interesting given the internal dynamic of Germany as a former Soviet state,
where tensions still exist between those who favor the old Russian-imposed system and
those who prefer the present-day liberal democracy30. Despite this, Germany’s affinity hovers below that of the other former Soviet states, and even below that of some of its Western
neighbors, including France, Austria and Belgium.
In the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey, when asked “To what extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s role as an energy provider?” 73 percent of those surveyed
in Germany said that they were “concerned,” and 31 percent said they were additionally
“very concerned.” In answer to the question: “To what extent are you concerned or not
26 OMV May Open Bratislava Link in 2010 to Tap Russia. (2009, 28 May). EU-Russia Centre. Retrieved January
14, 2010, from http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/news/omv-open-bratislava-link-2010-tap-russia.html.
27 Russia Today. (2009, 17 November). PM meeting cements Russia Slovakia energy ties - RT. RT: Business. Retrieved February 20, 2010, from http://rt.com/Business/2009-11-16/pm-meeting-cements-russia.html.
28 Socor,V. (2009, 27 January). A Window of Opportunity for the Nabucco Project at Budapest Meeting. Eurasia
Daily Monitor, 6(17). Retrieved March 31, 2010, from http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_
ttnews[tt_news]=34417&tx_ttnews[backPid]=485&no_cache=1.
29 International Energy Data and Analysis for Germany. (2010, January 6). U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Retrieved January 9, 2010, from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_energy_data.cfm?fips=GM&Go=Go
30 Jupille, J. (2009, October 23). Cleavages, Party System and Governing Coalitions: Germany, 1. Western European
Politics. Lecture conducted from University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO. pp. 15.
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about Russia’s behavior toward its neighbors?” 74 percent of German citizens replied that
they were “concerned”—the second highest rate in Europe, and significantly above the
European average of 65 percent. Additionally, when asked “To what extent you approve
or disapprove of [the idea that] we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even
if this requires additional investments to acquire different energy sources?” 84 percent of
Germans responded that they “approve”—the highest approval rating for this idea in Europe. Arguably, these answers belie the level of Germany’s political dissatisfaction with their
energy dependence, marking them once more as a customer beholden to Russia.
Despite these popular views, Germany’s growing economy demands a great deal of
energy resources, which is consequentially placing more of the electricity burden on natural
gas as domestic coal resources are depleted. Caught between a commitment to cut carbon
emissions by phasing out coal as a primary electrical source and a mandate to shut down all
nuclear reactors by 2020, Germany may have no choice but to break one of these promises
or become even more beholden to Russian natural gas until other renewable technologies
can catch up.
Based on its position in the theoretical framework, one would expect to see Germany
trying to diversify away from Russian gas with difficulty, while openly supporting projects
that would aid in divorcing itself and the EU from Russian gas dependence. At present,
Germany’s growing economy demands a great deal of energy resources, which is consequentially placing more of the electricity burden on natural gas as domestic coal reserves
are depleted. Caught between a commitment to cut carbon emissions by phasing out coal
as a primary electricity source and a mandate to shut down all nuclear reactors by 2020,
Germany may have no choice but to break one of these promises or become even more
beholden to Russian natural gas until other renewable technologies can catch up.
Heavy investment in renewables over the last five years has resulted in an increase in
the amount of electricity coming from renewable energy in Germany from 6.3 percent in
2000 to about 15 percent in 2008. But while Germany has made great strides in its renewable energy sector—it is the world’s largest wind power generator and the world’s largest
generator of electricity from non-hydroelectric renewables31—fossil fuels overwhelmingly
remain the primary source of electricity and broader energy generation, and with that comes
Russia’s 40 percent and growing role in Germany’s natural gas imports.
In order to meet the ever-increasing demand of its citizens, Germany has flexed its
sovereignty and signed on to several Russian pipeline endeavors, including Nord Stream,
an offshore natural gas pipeline that will transport Russian gas from Vyborg, Russia through
the Baltic Sea to Greifswald, Germany—bypassing Ukraine and also states like Poland and
Belarus that would otherwise receive a portion of any gas passing through their states at
discounted cost—thus securing a continuous gas supply for the Germans. Germany’s weight
in the European arena, as well as its central geographic positioning, makes these moves even
more damaging to its less influential neighbors, which depend on Germany and other allies
for support in negotiating energy contracts with Russian gas companies.
Despite these unilateral endeavors to secure its domestic energy supply, Germany remains one of the most vocal proponents of alternatives to Russian gas. Though outspokenly
supportive of the Nabucco plan, Chancellor Angela Merkel recently asked the EU not to
collectively fund the project, since Germany—as the largest economy on the continent—
31 Non-hydro Renewables Data. (2006, 27 September). U.S. Energy Information Administration. Retrieved November 28, 2009, from www.eia.doe.gov/pub/international/iealf/table17.xls.
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would be asked to foot the lion’s share of the bill32. Instead, the Chancellor has suggested
that the endeavor remain privately funded, citing no lack of corporate investment. Germany’s own RWE, the second-largest domestic gas and electric company in the country, has
joined five other energy companies in the Nabucco pipeline consortium. (RWE recently
announced that it is on the verge of securing a 10 billion cubic meter per year gas contract
with Turkmenistan, equivalent to one-third of Nabucco’s capacity33). Though not a transit
country and therefore not a signatory to the project, Germany was represented as an observer for the signing of the intergovernmental transport agreement between Turkey and the
four EU transit countries—Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania—in Ankara, Turkey34.
The Enemy: the United Kingdom
The representative “Enemy” has elastic price sensitivity, making diversification much
easier, coupled with Russophobic policies and a low public regard for Russia. The Enemy
represents those states trying to remain completely free from Russian monopoly of their
energy market. Looking at Table 1.4, one can see that the UK fits this mold precisely, with
very elastic demand and no Russian gas consumption, coupled with the lowest political affinity score in the EU and the highest level of concern in the public opinion survey.
Table 1.4
State
UK

Price Elasticity % Domestic Consumption
of Demand
that is Russian Gas
2.42
0

Mean
Transatlantic Trends
Pipeline Affinity'90-'02 Mean Concern Level (%)

o

0.45

77 .33333

According to the 2009 Transatlantic Trends survey, when asked, “To what extent are
you concerned or not about Russia’s role as an energy provider?” 76 percent of those surveyed in the UK said that they were “concerned,” and 40 percent moreover identified as
“very concerned.” This was the second highest level of general concern expressed in Europe35, and the highest number of “very concerned” responses. Additionally, when posed
the question, “To what extent are you concerned or not about Russia’s behavior toward its
neighbors?” citizens in the UK expressed the second-highest level of concern at 74 percent,
compared to a European mean of 65 percent, with 30 percent of those surveyed adding that
they were “very concerned.” Finally, when asked, “To what extent you approve or disapprove of [the idea that] we should reduce our energy dependence on Russia, even if this
requires additional investments to acquire different energy sources?” an overwhelming 82
percent of UK residents responded that they “approve,” with 53 percent adding that they
“approve very much” (the highest rate expressed in Europe).
Historically, the UK has utilized its extensive coal reserves for electricity and heating. However, large leaps in extracting oil and natural gas from its Atlantic Margin gas and
oil fields led to the “Dash for Gas” in the 1980s and 1990s—in which the UK’s electricity
32 No EU funding for Nabucco, says Merkel. (2010, 29 January). Euractive. Retrieved April 1, 2010, from http://
www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-funding-nabucco-merkel/article-179883.
33 Turkmen gas deal for Nabucco seen in months-RWE exec. (2010, 5 March). Reuters UK. Retrieved March 31,
2010 from http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKLDE6241WB20100305?sp=true.
34 Nabucco gas pipeline: new impetus through agreement between transit countries. (2009, 22 July). Wien International. Retrieved March 31, 2010, from http://www.wieninternational.at/en/node/15135.
35 After Poland, who was directly affected by one of the recent energy cutoffs.
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companies invested heavily in natural gas power plants due to the speed at which they could
be built relative to coal or nuclear power plants36. Natural gas’ share of electricity production rose dramatically, and by 2004 it had overtaken coal as the primary source of electricity generation. Despite currently being the thirteenth largest producer of natural gas in the
world, the UK faces a growing energy gap as its coal power plants and nuclear stations are
becoming increasingly outdated.
Within the present research model’s framework, one would expect to see the United
Kingdom heavily favor any programs that reduce European dependence on Russian natural
gas, despite its total lack of dependence on Russia for energy resources. Though geographically separate from the European continent and largely an unaffected bystander, the UK has
vocally backed Nabucco. Even so—like Germany—it would prefer not to foot the bill. As
a coal-rich state, the UK has pushed heavily for increased coal production and consumption
both domestically and within the EU, touting the fact that coal is an abundant alternative to
imported natural gas. However, strict EU carbon emissions laws have prevented enthusiasm
for the idea, despite the UK’s commitment to introducing new carbon capture and storage
technologies on their domestic power plants. Approximately one-third of the UK’s coal
plants are expected to close in the next decade due to their inability to meet the standards
of the European Large Combustion Plant Directive, while many of the nuclear generation
stations are applying for life-extensions, since their contracts are expected to run out in
the next decade. In anticipation of this, the UK has begun investing heavily in Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) transport and storage facilities, since unlike pipeline gas, LNG can be
shipped anywhere, meaning supplier choices are not as limited by proximity and pipeline
transit capability. While not decreasing overall natural gas dependence, the flexibility of
LNG transport would make it easier to move away from Russian gas in favor of fartherflung suppliers. In light of these developments, the UK faces the possibility of needing to
import natural gas within the next decade if it cannot move toward renewables, and it wants
to ensure that said gas doesn’t come primarily from Russia.
The UK’s resolve to act in a sovereignty-driven manner when it comes to energy
resources was perfectly summed up by Great Britain’s energy minister, Malcolm Wicks, on
a recent visit to Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, where he discussed the building of a transCaspian pipeline to carry gas to the EU: “Oil and gas issues are not just energy issues; they
are national security issues for many countries. The EU’s cooperation with countries in the
[Caspian] region should be seen through the prism of the energy security and national security of all states involved in these projects.37”
Conclusion
The initial hypothesis that states’ choices would depend on a combination of economic and domestic political factors—namely the price sensitivity of natural gas in each state and
its domestic political sentiment with regard to Russia—proved correct based on the model
presented herein. The European Union, while having proven a successful economic tool for
its members thus far, has demonstrated time and again its inability to adequately address the
36 Wheeler, B. (2004, April 22). The politics of power. BBC NEWS. Retrieved October 20, 2009, from http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3581637.stm
37 Socor,V. (2007, 25 September). Analysis: Gas discussions in Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan after the Budapest Nabucco conference. Eurasia Daily Monitor. Retrieved April 1, 2010, from http://politicom.moldova.org/news/analysisgas-discussions-in-turkmenistan-azerbaijan-after-the-budapest-nabucco-conference-72989-eng.html.
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issue of energy security, leaving its member states to act in their own self-interest at detriment to the whole.
In the past, the complex issue of EU energy security had been addressed on both
purely economic and supranational levels, but it had not hitherto been studied as a combination of domestic economic and political factors. In classifying member states based on
their individual situations with regard to Russia, the present research was able to construct a
framework for clearly identifying their present energy relationship with Russia—a tool that
is essential if the EU ever does want to form a coherent policy toward their primary natural
gas supplier.
Recognizing the obstacles facing the European experiment—including the desires of
each member to retain its sovereignty and build individual power and security—it is necessary for the EU to understand the underlying motivations for its member states’ varying degrees of natural gas trade with Russia. Looking to the price sensitivity of natural gas in each
state and their domestic political sentiment with regard to Russia, one can find compelling
evidence that these factors play a primary role in determining states’ choices in this arena,
with the domestic political aspect perhaps even trumping economic considerations. In classifying member states based on their individual situations with regard to Russia, the present
research was able to construct a framework for clearly identifying their present energy relationships with Russia—a tool that is essential if the EU ever does want to form a coherent
policy toward its primary natural gas supplier.
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